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It’s Elementary
A Monthly Column by EFAP Director John Yinger
June 2013

Redlining in California School Bond Ratings
School districts rely on the municipal bond market to spread out the burden of their
infrastructure projects. Without access to this market, school districts would have to save up
money for many years before they could build a new school or update their laboratories—or else
they would have to give up this capital spending altogether.
Under these circumstances, no school district should be penalized for characteristics that
are outside its control and unrelated to its ability to pay back its bonds. It would be unfair, and
contradictory to fundamental American principles, for example, if a school district with a
relatively high concentration of black citizens had to pay more for its bonds than a school district
with the same prospects for re-paying its bonds but with a relatively high concentration of white
citizens. And yet in this column I will provide some evidence that, because of the practices of
the bond rating agencies, this is exactly what happens. Surprisingly, this type of behavior is not
against the law. This nation has not yet passed civil rights legislation that covers this case. The
policy punch line of this column is that legislation of this type is badly needed.
My interest in this topic began with a project on general obligation, GO, municipal bonds
issued by big cities.1 These bonds are backed by the full taxing power of the issuing
government. Because schools are sometimes city departments, some of these bonds were
undoubtedly used to spread out the cost of school construction projects. In any case, I discovered
that GO bonds almost never default, and I could not find any examples of default among the
cities in several different samples. A default, of course, is a failure to make some of the
payments in a bond contract—or at least not to make them on time.
A key feature of the municipal bond market is that bond ratings agencies can be hired by
the issuing government to rate a bond issue. These ratings are intended to give investors
information about the quality of the bond issue as an investment. The three main municipal bond
rating agencies (Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch) say that their bond ratings are
measuring the probability of default. But if a category of bonds never defaults, this claim simply
cannot be true. In fact, the probability of default for a GO bond issued by a big city appears to
be zero! Thus, a bond rating agency cannot justify a lower rating for one city’s GO bonds than
for another’s on the grounds that the cities have different default probabilities.
Moreover, bond ratings have consequences. Many studies have documented that
municipal bonds with lower bond ratings, including GO bonds, must pay higher interest rates to
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attract investors. These interest payments are part of the cost of an infrastructure project, so
jurisdictions with lower bond ratings must pay more than other jurisdictions for the same project.
In some cases, of course, this higher cost is entirely justified because the bonds are backed by a
payment stream, such as rents or medical bills, associated with the project—a payment stream
that may not yield as much revenue as expected. Many bonds with this type of backing have
defaulted. But this is not the case with GO bonds, which do not default. As a result, school
districts that receive a relatively low bond rating for a set of GO bonds must pay a higher interest
rate than other school districts even though its probability of default is the same.
This difference in cost might not be an issue if it were a random phenomenon, but it
becomes quite worrisome if it contradicts principles of fair treatment that have proven important
to our nation in other contexts. To be specific, it becomes quite worrisome if the school districts
receiving lower ratings on their GO bonds have large minority populations. The Fair Housing
Act prohibits lenders and real estate brokers from providing fewer services or charging higher
prices in largely minority than in largely white neighborhoods—practices that are called
“redlining.” In my view, the same standard should be applied to credit rating agencies.
My 2010 article presents evidence that all three major municipal bond ratings agencies
give lower ratings for GO bonds to cities with a relatively high black or Hispanic population than
to cities with a relatively high white population. These lower ratings translate into higher costs
for infrastructure projects. Although it is not currently covered by any law, this behavior is a
type of redlining and is clearly unfair.
The California Bond Advisor web site recently posted information on the bonds issued by
school districts in California in 2012. By combining this information with demographic data
from the National Center for Education statistics, I was able to determine whether the bond
rating agencies also practice this type of redlining in their ratings of California school bond
issues.2 This analysis is limited to GO bonds issued by unified school districts, which are
districts that include all grades from kindergarten through high school. To the best of my
knowledge, none of these bonds, nor any other GO school bonds in California, have defaulted.
Tables 1 and 2 below describe these data. The entries in the first column of Table 1
describe the bond ratings. The first entry in this column is a rating by Moody’s; the second entry
is a rating by Standard and Poor’s or Fitch. Because the symbols used by Moody’s differ from
those used by the other two rating agencies, it is possible to determine that of the 54 bond issues
in this data set, 32 were rated by Moody’s, 38 were rated by Standard and Poor’s or Fitch (or
both), and 16 were rated by both Moody’s and one of the other agencies. No bond issue received
the highest possible rating (Aaa or AAA) or the next highest (AA1 or AA+), but Table 1
indicates that 18 districts received the third highest rating (AA2 or AA). The lowest observed
rating was A2, the sixth highest rating.
Table 2 reveals that unified school districts in California are quite varied in their ethnic
composition. The share of blacks plus Hispanics ranges from 7.8 percent to 73.0 percent,
whereas the Asian share ranges from 0.9 percent to 60.9 percent.
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Table 1. Ratings of California Unified School District GO Bonds, 2012
Rating
Numerical Equivalent
Number of Districts
Aa2 or AA
3
18
AA3 or AA4
22
A1 or A+
5
9
A2 or A
6
5
Table 2. Ethnic Composition of California Unified School Districts, 2010
Variable
Mean
Minimum
Maximum
Black or Hispanic Share
35.8%
7.8%
73.0%
Asian Share
11.8%
0.9%
60.9%
As in my 2010 article, the relationship between ethnic composition and GO bond ratings
is estimated using an ordered logit analysis, which is appropriate for an ordinal dependent
variable such as a bond rating. The results indicate whether the explanatory variables have a
statistically significant impact on the ordering of the dependent variable.3 As shown in Table 3,
both the black/Hispanic share and the Asian share have an impact on bond ratings that is
statistically significant at the standard 5 percent level. School districts with a relatively large
black and Hispanic population receive lower ratings, and districts with a relatively large Asian
population receive higher ratings, than largely white districts. These coefficients imply, for
example, that a district with the maximum observed black/Hispanic share would have a rating
two categories lower than a district with the minimum observed black/Hispanic share.
Table 3. Coefficient Estimates for Bond Ratings of CA Unified School Districts, 2012
Variable
Coefficient
z Statistic
Probability
Black or Hispanic Share
3.27
2.20
0.028
Asian Share
-5.90
-1.97
0.048
These results indicate that the ratings of school district GO bonds in California in 2012
reflect behavior by the bond ratings agencies that is analogous to redlining. Because lower bond
ratings lead to higher interest costs, this behavior implies that for no legitimate reason school
districts with a high black or Hispanic population have to pay more for infrastructure (and
districts with a high Asian population have to pay less for infrastructure) than school districts
that are largely white. This behavior does not violate any law of which I am aware, but it does
contradict principles of fairness that are widely recognized in our democracy.
New laws and enforcement mechanisms are needed to address this unfairness. Bond
ratings agencies should of course be given a chance to respond to any claim that they are
practicing redlining. Enforcement procedures based on those developed for existing civil rights
laws that identify redlining and give ratings agencies a chance to respond are explained in detail
in my 2010 article. Anyone interested in a level playing field for school capital finance should
push for these or similar procedures.
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